Parsha: Culpability without Commandment

Rav Aryeh Leibowitz

We generally look at the Torah as our source for defining commandments.  However, besides giving a Torah, God also gave man a mind.  Human intellect is also a source for truth.  Man must therefore use his intuition and rational insight to arrive at certain self-evident commandments.  

This is seen in this week's parsha when the Jewish soldiers returned from their war against Midian (Bamidbar, Chapter 31) Moshe criticizes them harshly for not killing all of the people of Midian. R. Yeshaya Horowitz (Shel”a, d. 1630) asks (Matos, Derech Chaim Tochachos, s.v. ויקצף) how Moshe could be so critical if he never explicitly commanded the soldiers who to kill and who to spare. The Shel”a answers that they should have used their logic and arrived at the correct conclusion on their own. They did not need a direct commandment, if their own logic would have arrived at the same conclusion.  

This approach of the Shel”a to the events with Midian was first stated in the early 13^th century by the Sefer Chasidim, attributed to R. Yehudah He-Chasid,

We find in the Torah that anyone who is able to understand [a commandment], even if it is not actually commanded, is deserving of punishment for not realizing on his own, as we find, “And Moshe was critical of the soldiers…” (Bamidbar 31:14)… Why did they not answer him, “You never commanded us!"...  It must be that Moshe knew that they were wise and learned enough to apply a logical (lit. an a fortiori) argument… (Sefer Chasidim, #153)

According to the Sefer Chasidim and Shel”a, a person is held accountable for sins or other non-desirable behavior if logic dictates that such an action should not be committed.

In the same vein, we find that Bilaam accepted blame upon himself when he hit his faithful donkey by stating, “I sinned, because I did not realize.”

Jewish Sages throughout the ages have drawn on this principle to explain the culpability of various people in history who were never explicitly commanded to refrain from sinful behavior.  For example, Rabbenu Bechaye )Bereshis 18:20) explains that for this reason the people of Sedom were deserving of punished for not helping one another.  He states that even though there was not yet any commandment to give charity or help another, such behavior is something the human mind should figure out on its own.[1]

A very early explicit formulation of this principle was expressed by R. Nissim Gaon of Kairouan (d. 1060), in the introduction to his Sefer Mafteach Man'ulei Ha-Talmud.  He writes,

All commandments that are products of logic and intuition, are already incumbent upon all – from the very day man was created on earth by God [i.e. before the giving of the Torah].  [These commandments] are [binding] upon him, his children, and for all generations.

We should merit to serve Hashem through allegiance to the Torah and through the utilization of our minds.[2]  

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[1] It’s interesting to note the slightly different formulation of R. Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin (Netziv, d. 1893) in his letter of approbation for the Chafetz Chaim’s Ahavas Chesed.  He states their behavior went against basic human decency that should have been part of their natural identity.  The same, he says, is why Kayin was able to be punished, even though there was no direct commandment not to kill.

[2] This being the case, human intelligence is certainly limited, especially when it confronts the infinite wisdom of Hashem (see Rambam, Yesodei ha-Torah 2:2).  Therefore there is obviously a very fine line here, as many times we are required to surrender our human understanding to fulfill the will of God.  Our words here do not suggest in any way that we should follow our limited intellect against a clear directive of the Torah or Chazal.