Parsha: Why Was Yitzchak Blind

Rav Yehuda Turetsky

The Torah (Breishit 27:1) tells us that Yitzchak became blind as he got older. This is certainly important information; it sets the stage for much of what will happen between Yaakov and Esav. Each wants their father’s blessing, and Yitzchak’s inability to see facilitates Yaakov's success in securing the Bracha.

Why did Yitzchak become blind? From the simple Peshat of the Pasuk (see Rashbam and Rabbeinu Bechai ad loc), it seems as if it was merely the result of old age. Yet, Chazal and many of the subsequent commentators list more than ten different explanations for Yitzchak’s blindness. What follows is attempt to categorize many of the different suggestions.

1. Some suggest that Yitzchak became blind as a form of punishment or direct result of negative conduct. The Talmud (Megilah 28a) states that he became blind because he looked directly at the face of Esav, his wicked son. The Medrash (Breishit Rabba 65:7) critiques him for receiving a “bribe” from Esav, as the Torah teaches that he loved Eisav because Eisav was “Tzayad BiFiv” (Breishit 25:28). Seforno (ad loc) similarly maintains that Yitzchak was punished because he failed to protest against his son’s evil actions.

2. Others understand that Yitzchak became blind not because of a mistake he made, but because of the positive life he lived. Ritva (Yoma 28b) writes that Yitzchak went blind because he was so dedicated to Torah throughout his life.  As the Talmud (Sanhedrin 26b) teaches, Torah makes a person weaker. Yitzchak’s lifetime of diligence took a toll on his physical health.

This approach highlights a powerful idea. Yitzchak suffered later in life as a result of his piety and holiness. He was so dedicated to Torah that it weakened his body. While it would always be easier and simpler if every good deed was immediately rewarded and had exclusively positive ramifications, Ritva’s perspective reminds us that the world can be more complex than that.  At times, one must engage in positive behavior in spite of the potential cost (though it must be a reasonable one). Sometimes there is a sacrifice involved in being ambitious, and Yitzchak serves as a great model of one who understood and internalized that message.  

3. A third approach is quoted in Rashi (ad loc). He writes that Yitzchak’s blindness was part of a larger divine plan to give Yaakov the Brachot. Yitzchak loved Esav and wanted to give him these special blessings, but God wanted Yaakov to receive them. Only through Yitzchak’s blindness could God’s true plan come to fruition; Yaakov could now claim his rightful place as the future leader of the Jewish people.

For Rashi, Yitzchak’s suffering must have been challenging, but should be perceived as part of the story of the Jewish people. At times pain may be experienced, yet it is our hope that it is part of our national redemption and collective desire for peace and salvation.  

Parsha: Why Must Avraham’s Descendants be Slaves in Egypt? Three Approaches

Rav Yehuda Turetsky

The Torah (Breishit 15:13) records Hashem’s powerful words to Avraham. Hashem tells Avraham that while his future progeny will eventually settle in Israel, they will first be slaves in a foreign land (Breishit 15:13).  They will encounter servitude prior to settling in their ultimate destination.

Why must Avraham’s children be slaves? Why could they not settle in Israel without the initial stage of servitude?

What follows are three answers to this question.

1. Some maintain that Avraham’s descendants must be slaves because of some sin Avraham performed that required his descendants be punished. This is the view of several opinions cited in the Talmud (Nedarim 32a), in which some possible sins of Avraham are mentioned. Ramban (Breishit 12:10) agrees with this general orientation, though he suggests an original explanation regarding Avraham’s sin. He critiques Avraham for leaving Israel for Egypt during a famine.  Whereas many Mefarshim understand that Avraham was correct for leaving Israel, Ramban maintains that Avraham should have remained in Israel; he should have trusted in God that things would be fine in Israel.

[Ramban’s view connects to his understanding of the phrase Ma’aseh Avot Siman L’Banim. He references this concept numerous times in his commentary to Sefer Breishit. His view also relates to a larger discussion about critiquing Avot. An overview of Ma’aseh Avot Siman L’Banim, as well as the concept of critiquing Avot, is beyond the scope of this brief post].

2. Sefer Ma’asei Hashem (cited in Chumash Otzar Mefarshei HaPshat Breishit 15:) quotes a view he attributes to an anonymous and early view. He suggests the Jews were slaves in Egypt not because of sin but in order to accomplish a higher purpose: the importance of spreading Hashem’s name in this world and highlighting His critical role in all that occurs. What was most valuable was not the slavery, but the exit from Egypt; the manner in which we left Egypt helped spread the name of God. The miracles performed and witnessed made it clear to so many that God controls the world. 

3. Perhaps one could suggest a third view. The Brisker Rav (Chidushei HaGriz Al haTorah ad loc) suggests that God was not merely informing Avraham what would eventually occur to his children. It was not merely a prophecy. Instead, Hashem was establishing a condition (“tnai”) to the covenant between God and the Jewish people. Only if they would first be slaves in Egypt would they be able to settle in Israel.

The Brisker Rav’s idea highlights an important point, though one that is difficult to understand. The acquisition of Eretz Yisrael is always challenging; the Talmud (Brachot 5a) even teaches that Israel is one of three things only acquired through hardship.

Perhaps one could explain that it is the unique power and spiritual capacity of this land that demands a certain form of acquisition. Israel is such a special place that it cannot be acquired through conventional means. The initial struggle is critical for our being worthy and deserving of this special land.

May we merit a complete return to Israel!

Punishment without Prohibition? Ramban on Noach’s Generation

Rav Yehuda Turetsky

The Talmud (Sanhedrin 108a, cited by Rashi on Breishit 6:13) teaches that while the generation of the flood had sinned in various ways, they were ultimately punished because they stole. Ramban (ad loc) is bothered by a simple question. How could that generation have been punished for thievery? They never received a divine command against stealing, yet they are still considered responsible for their actions.  Can God really punish them for doing something He never told them to avoid?

Ramban answers that certain Mitzvot are logical and do not require an explicit command. Stealing from others is such an obvious prohibition that God had no need to tell them to avoid it; they should have figured that out on their own and refrained from such activities.

Ramban’s idea has several important implications.

1. Be’er Shevah (Sanhedrin, ad loc) notes that the generation of the flood violated other prohibitions that are logical, yet specifically this one is what generated such a harsh punishment. He explains that God is willing to forgive those sins that are purely between man and God. God, though, is unwilling to overlook those that negatively impact others. For that reason, they were punished for stealing, not for violating those prohibitions that are between man and God. 

This may be part of a larger discussion regarding the severity of interpersonal sins. Certainly, it expresses a fundamental point about our relationship with others. Hashem views the manner in which we interact with other people as critically important and very significant in determining the status of a person. Certain activities cannot be tolerated, and all people are supposed to hold themselves to certain standards. 

2. Ramban assumes there are Mitzvot  for which one can be responsible even in the absence of a divine command. This has important implications for a larger discussion regarding the existence of ethics and morality independent of Halacha. [See Rav Nissim Gaon’s introduction to the Talmud and Rav Aharon Lichtenstein’s well-known article on this topic. This also relates to several other comments of Ramban on Chumash]. For Ramban, the generation of the flood should have carefully thought about their actions and recognized the immorality of thievery.  They should have refrained from stealing even though no one had explicitly told them it was wrong. 

Rav Shlomo Wolbe (Shiurim on Chumash ad loc) even notes that Ramban’s view assumes that sins we should have recognized on our own are treated even more severely than those God commanded us explicitly.  

Within this perspective, there is a clear expectation to be “thinking people” and aware of our actions. We are expected to engage in certain forms of introspection and to develop an internal moral compass of right and wrong. This is all the more so true when it comes to compassion and sensitivity towards others and their property. It is so basic and fundamental; all are obligated and expected to follow certain standards of appropriate behavior.

Parsha: Noach - Who is a Tzadik?

Rav Aryeh Leibowitz

The Torah refers to two individuals as “tzadik” – Noach and Yosef.   What links these two great men?  What common trait earns them alone the title “tzadik?” 

Both Noach and Yosef provided for others - Noach in the teiva feeding the multitudes of animals and Yosef as the viceroy of Egypt feeding the inhabitants of Egypt (Midrash Tanchuma).  It was their concern for others and their willingness to sacrifice for them that gained Noach and Yosef the title “tzadik.”  

In fact, we find in both of their respective situations another manifestation of their sensitivity to the plight of others.  Noach and Yosef both found themselves in situations where others were suffering, while they experienced relative comfort.  Noach enjoyed the protection of the teiva as the outside world suffered.  Yosef enjoyed the bounty of Pharaoh’s palace, while the general population starved.  How did they react to their respective situations?  Chazal highlight that both refrained from marital intimacy throughout the tenure of the ordeals, for they deemed this behavior to be inappropriate in light of the plight of those around them.  Here too, we see the tremendous sensitivity for others that these two great men exhibited.

  

The Torah teaches us by calling only these two men “tzadik” that providing for others and being sensitive to their circumstances is the definition of a true tzadik.  Indeed, the word “Tzadik” (צדיק) comes from the root “tzedek” (צדק), which is generally used in Tanach to refer specifically to proper behavior between man and man - mitzvot bein adam le-chaveiro (See Malbim, bi’ur ha-milim, Yeshaya 51:1). 

The importance of how we treat others is also borne out from the end of our parsha.  One notes that the generation of the flood was utterly destroyed, while the generation of the tower of Bavel did not suffer destruction.  Why did Hashem deem the sin of the tower builders, who rejected the dominion of Hashem, less offensive than the generation of the flood, who stole and cheated?  Chazal teach us that from here we see that sins between man and man are far more egregious in the eyes of Hashem than those between man and God.  

Why does the Torah Begin with Sefer Breishit? Three Classic Approaches

Rav Yehuda Turetsky

The Torah (Breishit 1:1) opens with a discussion of the world’s creation, and much of Sefer Breishit explores the history of mankind from Adam through Yaakov’s children. We are taught much about the lives of the Avot and their unique contributions, with a particular focus on the general development of the group that would eventually become the Jewish people.

For many, Sefer Breishit is a logical way to begin the Torah. Chronologically, creation is certainly an appropriate place to start. The Sefer as a whole also provides necessary information about the formation of our people. Yet, many Mefarshim are bothered by the choice.

What follows are three approaches towards the Torah’s opening.

1. Rashi (Breishit 1:1) cites Rav Yitzchak’s well-known interpretation. He assumes that the most appropriate starting point of Chumash would have been the first Mitzvah, the command to establish a Jewish calendar (Kiddush HaChodesh). He explains that Sefer Breishit was written to clearly establish our claim to Eretz Yisrael. The same God who created the world gave us Israel, and there should be no doubt in anyone’s mind that it is rightfully ours.

Rashi’s explanation is fascinating on many levels. First, he appears to assume (at least initially) that the Torah is primarily a book of laws, leading him to question the role and function  of all of Sefer Breishit. [There is some debate amongst Mefarshim regarding this assumption]. Additionally, his suggestion underscores for us the uniqueness of Eretz Yisrael. This book of laws does not begin with its natural starting point, in order to establish our claim to this special land. This certainly fits with the Sifri’s statement (Parshat Devarim) that dwelling in Israel is “shakul”, or considered equal, to all the other Mitzvot.

[The precise meaning of “Shakul” is beyond the scope of this brief post. For a discussion about this, see Rav Shlomo Wolbe’s important work, “Mitzvot Shekulot”.]

2. Ramban (Breishit 1:1) discusses Rashi’s view and approaches Sefer Breishit in an alternate way. For him, it makes sense to begin with creation since creation is the source of our faith in God. A critical component of the faith of any believing Jew is the tenet that God created the world. For him, Chumash is a work that offers us theology and not just law, an understanding of creation and not just Mitzvot.  He does note the challenge in understanding creation and therefore suggests an alternate understanding of Rashi’s Medrash. Still, his general orientation is clear. Creation is a most appropriate place to begin the Torah in order to establish one of the essential underpinnings of the Jewish belief.

3. Netziv (Introduction to Sefer Breishit) offers a well-known and critically important idea. Sefer Breishit is referred to by Chazal as Sefer haYashar, the book of the right or straight. Though this is a somewhat ambiguous title, Netziv understands it to mean that Breishit comes to teach us how to act and develop appropriate character traits. We are to learn from the Avot how to behave and cultivate sensitivity and care towards others. While the study of Torah is obviously important, that is not enough, and one must learn from the actions of the Avot how to behave towards others, including those with whom we disagree.

Each approach offers an idea about important pillars of our Avodat Hashem. Rashi highlights the primacy of Eretz Yisrael as well as of our Mitzvot. We are supposed to be Jews, perhaps first and foremost, that value Mitzvah observance and appreciate the unique role of Eretz Yisrael in our lives. Ramban reminds us of another core element of Torah, that of theology and belief. We are not just commanded to act, but to believe. [See Ramban to Shemot 20 and Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot mitzvah 1]. Netziv highlights a third and most fundamental idea. Mitzvot are important, as is theology, but interpersonal conduct remains most essential. Torah study, belief, and observance are incredibly significant, but the Torah begins with a book about Middot and sensitivity. We are commanded to behave as a unique people, sensitive to the needs of others.

May we be Zocheh to excel in all these areas!

Parsha: What are Hidden and Revealed Mitzvot?

Rav Turetsky

The Torah (Devarim 29:28) includes a somewhat cryptic Pasuk in Parshat Netzavim. We are told, "הנסתרות לה' אלוקינו והנגלות לנו ולבננו עד עולם", that the hidden is for Hashem, but the public is for us and our children forever.  Yet, we are not taught what exactly is being referred to as hidden and revealed, and how that connects to God and our descendents.

What is the meaning of this Pasuk?

Rashi (ad loc) understands the Pasuk as a reference to communal responsibility. The hidden alludes to sins performed privately by individuals. Others are not aware of them, and those sins remain solely between the individuals who performed them and God; no one else knows of their existence. However, there are also public sins of others, of which we are aware and deemed accountable. The Torah teaches that such acts are “for us and our children”; it is our responsibility to improve others around us whenever we can.

For Rashi, this Pasuk teaches a very important lesson about our religious obligations. We are expected to be concerned (and are even liable) for that which is done publicly by others. Religious life is not only about one’s own Divine worship; it must also concern itself with the religious observance of our fellow Jews.

Ramban (ad loc) suggests that the Torah distinguishes between two kinds of sins. The “private sins” are a reference to unintentional acts of which a person is unaware. Those are not as severe or egregious, and only God knows of them. However, the Torah also refers to “public sins”, those that are intentional and known to the sinner. Those are taken much more seriously and are treated with increased severity.

This idea highlights an important element of the Teshuva process. One facet of the Teshuva process certainly involves an honest accounting and confrontation with one’s errors and iniquities.

Chatam Sofer suggested a very powerful idea. Each person performs Mitzvot that are “hidden”, or only known to them. Those are important religiously, but their impact is limited. Rather, it is specifically one who performs Mitzvot in public that impacts others.  For Chatam Sofer, that is the meaning of the Pasuk – the hidden are only for God, but the public are for us and our children forever. Our families and communities gain tremendously from the Mitzvot we perform in public forums. They help set a positive religious tone and creative an atmosphere conducive towards religious growth. They contribute to our familial and communal legacy.

Chatam Sofer is not recommending a haughty or arrogant approach to one’s Mitzvah observance. Certainly one must make sure Mitzvot are not performed for the sake of others seeing them. Rather, Chatam Sofer teaches an important insight into religious life. We have an incredible capacity to positively impact others through our actions.

Rashi reminds us of our communal responsibility, while Ramban writes of our need to rectify our sins. Chatam Sofer offers a recommendation for the long-term success of our people.

May we be Zocheh to live religiously ambitious lives privately and publically.

Parsha: Why do Mitzvot Need a Bracha? Two Approaches

Rav Yehuda Turetsky

The Torah (Devarim 26:13-14) records the Mitzvah of Viduy Ma’asrot. At the end of the 3rd and 6th year of each Shemita cycle, we are commanded to recite certain statements confirming our fulfillment of the Halakhic obligation to separate Ma’aser. Part of what we recite is that we did not forget, "לא שכחתי", yet the Torah does not clarify what exactly we remembered. Based on Chazal (Mishna Ma’aser Sheni 5:11), Rashi (ad loc) writes that this is a reference to the Bracha on separating Ma’aser. For Rashi, we are saying not only that we separated the Ma’aser, but that we did so with a Bracha.

Rashi’s comment is often discussed for its halakhic implications. We typically assume that the Bracha recited upon performing Mitzvot is only rabbinic[i], and yet Rashi finds reference to it in the Torah itself. Others, in particular in Chassidic sources, focus on this Rashi to highlight important ideas related to the Brachot we recite on Mitzvot.  In particular, many wonder why we recite the Bracha on Mitzvot specifically prior to actually fulfilling the Mitzvah[ii]. Why must it be done in such a way,?

We will offer two ideas from Gerrer Chassidut[iii].

1. Sefat Emet (Parshat Ki Tavo 5631) quotes the Chiddushei HaRim with the following insight. One would have thought to recite a Bracha on a Mitzvah after performing it; we usually praise Hashem after an event has occurred, not before it happened[iv]. He explained that although it would have been more appropriate to thank Hashem for the opportunity to perform the Mitzvah only afterwards, it is the Jewish way to  praise Hashem earlier, even before we’ve experienced the Mitzvah.  For Chiddushei HaRim, the Bracha we recite prior to reciting a Mitzvah is our praise to Hashem for the Mitzvah. We feel so appreciative that we do not wait until we’ve performed it. We want to express our appreciation even prior to performing it.
2. Imrei Emet[v] explained that the Talmud (Brachot 35a) teaches that one must ask permission before eating food because it is inappropriate to benefit from this world without reciting a Bracha. Imrei Emet explains that the same is true with spiritual benefit. The Mitzvot are so beneficial to us that it would not be appropriate to perform a Mitzvah without first requesting permission from Hashem to derive such pleasure.

Each approach highlights an important idea about the blessing on Mitzvot. Chiddushei HaRim teaches that Mitzvot are worthy of praise. The opportunity to perform Mitzvot should not be seen as burdens but as occasions in which to thank Hashem. We bless Hashem to express our joy at the opportunity to perform a Mitzvah. Imrei Emet reminds us of another idea about Mitzvot. They offer us real benefit. It may not be physical, but Mitzvot are a great form of spiritual benefit.

Shabbat Shalom!

[i] See, for example, Talmud Brachot 15a.

[ii] See Talmud Pesachim 7b.

[iii] For an additional perspective in Gerrer Chasidut, see Sefat Emet (Matot 5638).

In truth, each perspective reflects a different understanding of the precise function of a Bracha prior to reciting Mitzvot. See, for example, Ritva (Peachim 7b), Ohr Zaruah (no. 140), Rambam (Hilkhot Brachot 1:3), and Eretz HaTzvi (no. 3).

[iv] This is the general rule in regards to Birchat HaShevach, blessings in which we praise Hashem.

[v] This is found in Pardes Yosef (HaChadash) pg. 1140, quoted Imrei Emet’s comments on the MIshnayot in Ma’aser Sheni.

Parsha: Culpability without Commandment

Rav Aryeh Leibowitz

We generally look at the Torah as our source for defining commandments.  However, besides giving a Torah, God also gave man a mind.  Human intellect is also a source for truth.  Man must therefore use his intuition and rational insight to arrive at certain self-evident commandments.  

This is seen in this week's parsha when the Jewish soldiers returned from their war against Midian (Bamidbar, Chapter 31) Moshe criticizes them harshly for not killing all of the people of Midian. R. Yeshaya Horowitz (Shel”a, d. 1630) asks (Matos, Derech Chaim Tochachos, s.v. ויקצף) how Moshe could be so critical if he never explicitly commanded the soldiers who to kill and who to spare. The Shel”a answers that they should have used their logic and arrived at the correct conclusion on their own. They did not need a direct commandment, if their own logic would have arrived at the same conclusion.  

This approach of the Shel”a to the events with Midian was first stated in the early 13^th century by the Sefer Chasidim, attributed to R. Yehudah He-Chasid,

We find in the Torah that anyone who is able to understand [a commandment], even if it is not actually commanded, is deserving of punishment for not realizing on his own, as we find, “And Moshe was critical of the soldiers…” (Bamidbar 31:14)… Why did they not answer him, “You never commanded us!"...  It must be that Moshe knew that they were wise and learned enough to apply a logical (lit. an a fortiori) argument… (Sefer Chasidim, #153)

According to the Sefer Chasidim and Shel”a, a person is held accountable for sins or other non-desirable behavior if logic dictates that such an action should not be committed.

In the same vein, we find that Bilaam accepted blame upon himself when he hit his faithful donkey by stating, “I sinned, because I did not realize.”

Jewish Sages throughout the ages have drawn on this principle to explain the culpability of various people in history who were never explicitly commanded to refrain from sinful behavior.  For example, Rabbenu Bechaye )Bereshis 18:20) explains that for this reason the people of Sedom were deserving of punished for not helping one another.  He states that even though there was not yet any commandment to give charity or help another, such behavior is something the human mind should figure out on its own.[1]

A very early explicit formulation of this principle was expressed by R. Nissim Gaon of Kairouan (d. 1060), in the introduction to his Sefer Mafteach Man'ulei Ha-Talmud.  He writes,

All commandments that are products of logic and intuition, are already incumbent upon all – from the very day man was created on earth by God [i.e. before the giving of the Torah].  [These commandments] are [binding] upon him, his children, and for all generations.

We should merit to serve Hashem through allegiance to the Torah and through the utilization of our minds.[2]  

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[1] It’s interesting to note the slightly different formulation of R. Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin (Netziv, d. 1893) in his letter of approbation for the Chafetz Chaim’s Ahavas Chesed.  He states their behavior went against basic human decency that should have been part of their natural identity.  The same, he says, is why Kayin was able to be punished, even though there was no direct commandment not to kill.

[2] This being the case, human intelligence is certainly limited, especially when it confronts the infinite wisdom of Hashem (see Rambam, Yesodei ha-Torah 2:2).  Therefore there is obviously a very fine line here, as many times we are required to surrender our human understanding to fulfill the will of God.  Our words here do not suggest in any way that we should follow our limited intellect against a clear directive of the Torah or Chazal.  

Parsha: How Could Pinchas Kill Zimri?

Rav Yehuda Turetsky

The Torah (Bamidbar 25:6-9) concludes last week’s Parsha by recording Pinchas’ heroic actions. Like many others, he witnesses Zimri’s inappropriate behavior with a Midianite woman. Others remain passive, but Pinchas takes the initiative and slays Zimri, effectively serving as judge, jury, and executioner. In the beginning of this week’s Parsha, the Torah (Bamidbar 25:10-13) records God’s response. He blesses Pinchas with a covenant of peace[1] (“Briti Shalom”) and makes Pinchas into a Kohen[2].

Some ask an interesting question. The Torah emphasizes Pinchas’ relationship to Aharon, and he, similar to Aharon, becomes a Kohen. Typically, Kohanim are associated with peace and Chesed; the Mishna (Avot 1:12) even describes Aharon’s defining characteristic as one who pursues peace and brings others closer to Torah.  Yet, Pinchas’ actions appear harsh and callous, anything but what we would expect from a student of Aharon.

How could someone so connected to the ideals of Aharon kill Zimri? Pinchas should have been an “Ish Chesed”, but instead he engages in an act that appears to be so harsh and even ruthless.  And why would the reaction to his act of brutality, albeit righteous and meritorious, make him worthy of receiving a covenant of peace and the Kehunah?

1. The Kedushat Levi (Parshat Pinchas) suggests that Pinchas’ actions are actually a function of his incredible Chesed. What motivates him is not anger towards Zimri, but a strong desire to prevent Zimri from sinning. He acts not out of heartlessness but out of care and compassion. Pinchas believes the greatest act of Chesed he could do is prevent a sinner from sinning.  This helps explain why his reward is becoming a Kohen. His act is the ultimate demonstration of Chesed, albeit in complex circumstances and in a way in which others should certainly not replicate.

2. Perhaps one could suggest an additional idea.  Pinchas’ actions go against his nature. As a descendent of Aharon, he naturally 

excells more in acts of kindness than the kinds of harsh actions demanded here. What makes Pinchas unique was his ability to rise to the occasion when there is a need for him to do so. His greatness lies not only in his ability to do that which he is naturally good at, but also that which is for him more challenging and demanding.

If so, perhaps one can better appreciate Hashem’s response to Pinchas. Pinchas engaged in an act that went against his natural character and abilities. Hashem responds by giving Pinchas a covenant of peace and Kehunah. Perhaps Hashem is showing that Pinchas’ actions did not change who he was as a person. True, he rose to the occasion by killing Zimri, but it did not transform him or come at the expense of his natural kindness and Chesed[3].

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[1] There is debate amongst the Mefarshim what is a covenant of peace. See Ibn Ezra, Sefarno, and Netziv (ad loc).

[2] See Rashi (Bamidbar 25:13).

[3]  See Netziv (ibid).

Parsha: Pinchas - Restoring the Equilibrium

Rav Aryeh Leibowitz

Pinchas’ act – when viewed in a vacuum - appears to be cruel and brazen.  Yet, as it is presented by the Torah, the correctness of his behavior is unquestionable.  In the Torah's portrayal, Pinchas’ act of vengeance was not sinful, rather it was the act of Zimri and Cuzbi that was the sin.  But what exactly was Pinchas trying to accomplish with his zealous act?

Perhaps the answer is seen in Pinchas' reward: A "covenant of shalom."  What is “shalom?”  The true definition is: equilibrium or balance.  Shalom, in its greatest expression, is when there is harmonious coexistence of opposing forces. Hashem is actually described as one who makes shalom in Heaven (עושה שלום במרומיו), for he is able to bring together opposites, such as אש and מים – the “stuff” that makes up the שמים.  For this reason shalom also means peace, as in the peace that exists between nations or that which signifies the conclusion of war.  When a husband and wife, two very different creatures, are able to live harmonious under the same roof, it is called shalom bayis.

From this perspective, perhaps we can suggest that the act of Zimri and Kuzbi destroyed a certain moral and spiritual equilibrium in the nation.  Pinchas reinstated that balance by eliminating them, and sending a crucial message, at a crucial time, to the masses.  The restorative and redemptive nature of Pinchas’ act was confirmed by Hashem when he granted Pinchas the “covenant of shalom.”

Another important lesson is learned from the actions of Pinchas.  Pinchas demonstrated that harmony is not always achieved through passivity or meekness.  Sometimes, extreme situations require firm, and even extreme, actions.  Perhaps this Torah principle is expressed in the pasuk: ה' עז לעמו יתן ה' יברך את עמו בשלום.  Hashem grants His nation strength, and it is specifically through strength that they achieve peace.  This sentiment was once echoed by American president Ronald Reagan who cautioned his nation during the cold war to not be fooled by the “illusion of peace,” but to realize that they must “find peace through strength.”

Defining shalom as harmonious co-existence, or a state of equilibrium, explains why Pinchas was also rewarded with priesthood.  The primary role of the Kohen is to facilitate co-existence and harmony.  The paradigm of this on the inter-personal level was Ahron ha-Kohen, who was known for “making shalom and pursuing shalom.”  But each and every Kohen also fulfilled this mission when he brought korbanos on behalf of the nation.  The Korbanos serve to sow harmony between man and Hashem.  The exact explanation of this is beyond the scope of this current dvar Torah, but suffice it for now to quote the words of Chazal in the Sifrei: “All animal sacrifices are shalom for the world (כל הזבחים הם שלום בעולם).”  Consistent with the role of being facilitators of harmony, the Kohen blesses the nation every day right before the request of שים שלום.

Shabbos also shares this quality.  It is called “shalom” by the Zohar, it is identified by Chazal as a day of harmony between this world and the next, its angels are called מלאכי השלום, and we specifically switch in Shabbos ma’ariv the concluding beracha before the amidah to a request from Hashem to spread his סכת שלום upon us.  Perhaps for this reason we don’t say in Hebrew “Shabbos Tov,” as the Yiddish phrase “ah gutten Shabbos,” or the English “Good Shabbos” suggests.  Rather we bless one another with a “Shabbat Shalom!”

Parsha: What was Moshe's Sin? Lessons in Leadership

Rabbi Yehuda Turetsky

The Torah (Bamidbar Chap. 20) records the events surrounding Bnei Yisrael's request for water. Moshe and Aharon received instructions from Hashem and they eventually brought water to the Jewish people. Yet, something went wrong, and Hashem informed Moshe and Aharon that they would not be able to enter Eretz Yisrael. 

What exactly was Moshe's sin? While there are certain indications in the Pesukim, there are a range of answers found in the classical Mefarshim. Ohr HaChaim (Bamidbar 20:8) even mentions ten different explanations, and some later Mefarshim have found even more. 

We will highlight two general perspectives, each with an important lesson about Jewish leadership. 

1. Rashi (Bamidbar 20:12) famously states that Moshe's sin was in hitting the rock instead of speaking to it. He could have sanctified God's name by showing the Jewish people that even an inanimate object (such as a rock) listens to God. If so, certainly the Jews should listen to Hashem. An additional explanation is suggested by Rambam (Shemoneh Perakim chap. 6, cited by Ohr HaChaim and others) and others. They explain that Moshe was angry when speaking to Klal Yisrael. 

What both of those approaches highlight is that leadership is not always about getting results. It's also about the process, the manner in which it is done. The Jewish people got water, but there was a problem in how they got it. Effective leadership involves not only accomplishing for others. It demands modeling positive traits and values throughout the process. 

2. It is possible there is an additional perspective. (This general approach is suggested by Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, former Chief Rabbi of England, as well as some others, all be it each with slightly different formulations). Many of the Mefarshim are bothered by Moshe's harsh punishment. Was his sin really so terrible that he was not worthy of leading the Jewish people into Israel? Also, it is certainly interesting that there are so many views as to the nature of Moshe's sin. It is hard to overlook the ambiguity generated by the Pesukim and found in the Mefarshim as to what he actually did wrong. As such, maybe one could suggest that what happened in this Parsha was less a classic sin followed by a harsh punishment. Rather, this episode clarified that Moshe was no longer the right leader for the Jewish people who where about to enter Israel. This was a new generation, and maybe they needed a new leader. Working off of Rambam's approach mentioned above, maybe the way Moshe spoke to the Jews was not in line with what would work best for them. It is not C"V a deficiency in Moshe or a critique of him, but rather an understanding that not all leaders, even exceptional ones, are the best for each group and in all times.

Each perspective adds insight into the role of Jewish leadership. The first reminds us that great leaders don't just deliver to their followers, but model the kind of behavior the inspires them to reach greater heights. The second highlights an important idea about the relationship between leaders and their followers. Each must understand the other, and a leader must be the right fit for his time and place. 

Parsha: Korach’s Claims - Three Approaches to a Mistake

Rav Yehudah Turetsky

Chazal[1] record two of the claims Korach made towards Moshe. First, Korach questioned whether a garment that is entirely blue still requires Tzitit.  Korach reasoned that since a single blue string is all that’s needed for a garment made entirely of white,[2] a Begged consisting entirely of blue strings should not require any additional Techelet attached to it. The second claim Korach made was in regard to a house filled with Seforim, in which Korach reasoned that such a place should not require a Mezuzah. Moshe responded in both cases that Korach’s claims were incorrect.

What motivated Korach? It is hard to believe he was only asking narrow Halakhic questions about the laws of Mezuzah and Tzitzit. What was really bothering him?

1. Rav Soloveitchik[3] famously understood that Korach made a fundamental error about the Halakhic process. Korach thought that logic and common sense alone are able to dictate Halakha. For that reason, he made Halakhic claims that appear reasonable and compelling. What he failed to understand is that Halakha is a self-contained discipline in which human logic is not always the sole determining factor.[4] Moshe did not question whether Korach’s arguments made sense, as much as whether they reflected a proper assessment of the Halakha.  

2. Tzaidah LaDerech (ad loc[5]) suggests that Korach’s argument was far more sweeping than it initially appeared. Korach’s real claim was that Halakha is less binding on that which is already holy. A room filled with Seforim does not need a Mezuzah, and a garment made of Techelet does not require Tzitzit. Mitzvot are less critical for that which is already sacred. Korach viewed the entire Jewish people as holy (Bamidbar 16:3. Through these claims, he was really questioning whether Mitzvot are truly necessary at all.  The Jewish people are sufficientlyinhrently holy so as to render Mitzvot superfluous.

3. Perhaps one can suggest a slightly different perspective. While this idea is similar to Tzaidah LaDerech’s, maybe there’s a reason why Korach focused specifically on Tzitzit and Mezuzah[6]. Both of those Mitzvot share one thing in common; they are spiritual reminders. Tzitzit remind us of all the Mitzvot. They help ensure our observance and religious awareness. Rambam (Hilchot Tefilin, Mezuzah and Sefer Torah 6:13) writes similarly about Mezuzah. Each time we enter and exit our homes, the Mezuzah reminds us of God’s role in this world[7].

Perhaps what Korach failed to appreciate was not the importance of all Mitzvot, as suggested by Tzaidah LaDerech, but rather specifically those that are there to help us remember God and His Mitzvot. Maybe Korach thought that the Jewish people were sufficiently holy so as to not require the kind of “token” reminders provided by these Mitzvot. It is easy to belittle that which appears to have less independent value with the feeling that those Mitzvot are less necessary. Truly successful people recognize the need for help and reminders in continuing their religious growth and development.

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[1] See Rashi Bamidbar 16:1

[2] There is a debate amongst Rishonim how many blue strings of Tekhelet one requires. See Rashi, Tosafot, Rambam, and Ra’avad for a discussion about this.

[3] Rav Soloveitchik, “The Common-Sense Rebellion Against Torah Authority”. This is printed in Reflections of the Rav Vol. 1. Rav Soloveitchik’s actual approach is more nuanced than what is presented here, and it is certainly recommended to read it inside.

[4] This is not to state that logic is never a factor or that sevarah plays no role. See, for example, Brachot 35a with Pnei Yehoshua (ad loc), Rav Soloveitchik cautions that logic alone is not enough to determine Halakha.

[5] This is quoted in Rav Mordechai Eliyahu’s commentary on the Torah, Divrei Mordechai.

[6] See Divrei Mordechai in the beginning of Parshat Korach.

[7] See Rambam inside for his precise formulation.

Parsha: The Holy Mergalim???

Rav Yehuda Turetsky

The Gemara (Megilah 23b) derives from a Pasuk describing the Meraglim that ten men are required for a Minyan (a Davar SheBikedusha). It is certainly surprising that Chazal learned specifically from these individuals. Why would a Halacha about the standards needed for an act of holiness be derived from people who sinned so greatly?

What is the significance of learning a Halacha about Kedusha from people who appear to be anything but holy?

1. Rav Menachem Mendel of Rimanov[1] suggested that the Meraglim really were holy people. They sinned, but those sins were not actually so terrible. The Meraglim were only dealt with so harshly because people of an elevated status are always held to higher standards. Rav Menachem Mendel therefore suggests there is no problem learning a Halacha about holiness from such people.

His approach appears hard to accept within the simple reading of the Pesukim and various comments of Chazal that portray the sins of the Meragim as particularly egregious. It should be noted, though, that his general perspective is in line with other Hasidic sources that offer more positive interpretations of the various sins found in Sefer BaMidbar.[2]

2. It is possible there is a halachic implication that emerges from this source. Rav Moshe Feinstein[3] was asked whether Shabbat desecrators can be counted towards a Minyan. While many Poskim discuss this question, and there are a variety of factors that impact the halachic conclusion, Rav Moshe relate to the source as a possible indication that one could include such individuals. If we learn this Halacha from Meraglim, people who sinned in such an egregious way, certainly Shabbat desecrators can also count. Within this idea, it is possible the Torah chose to learn specifically from the Meraglim to teach a Halacha about the kinds of people that count for a Minyan.

3. Rav Schachter[4] offers an additional suggestion. Perhaps the Halacha is learned from the Meraglim for a different reason. The Gemara[5] states that the true Jewish community is found specifically within Eretz Yisrael. According to the Gemara[6], those Jews outside of Israel are viewed, at least in regard to specific halachot, as individuals. This is as opposed to those who live inside Eretz Yisrael that are viewed as members of a Tzibur. As such, Rav Schachter suggests that we learn the Halacha of a Minyan specifically from the Meraglim. Since the Meraglim were the only ones who had been in Eretz Yisrael, they are the best people to serve as a source for the Halacha of what constitutes a Halachic Tzibbur.

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[1] Cited in Iggerah D’Pirkah 1:33.

[2] Many such ideas can be found in the writings of the Mai HaShiloach of Ishbitz and his student Rav Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin.

[3] Shut Iggerot Moshe O.C. 1:23.

[4] http://torahweb.org/torah/2013/parsha/rsch_shlach.html.

[5] Horiyot 3.

[6] This is further articulated by Rambam in a variety of places See, for example, Perush HaMishnayot to Bechorot.

Parsha: Living With Depth Perception

Rav Aryeh Leibowitz

In the context of tzitis the Torah tells us not to stray after our eyes (“לא תתרו אחרי... עיניכם”).  Generally, this is understood to be an admonition against straying after sins that entice the eyes.  However, there is another possible explanation of this verse.  

A person’s vision is limited to seeing only that which is external.  Mans eye’s are unable to pierce the outer surface of things, and they cannot see what which is within.   Therefore, the inner essence of another being or object is unperceivable to the naked eye.  The Sefas Emes (Shelech 5631) suggests that this is the explanation of the above quoted verse.  The Torah is commanding us not to stray after our surface perceptions.  We mustn’t look at the world with superficial eyes, rather we must seek out the inner essence (פנימיות) of that which we encounter. 

This is especially true in regards to our own self-perception.  Many people refrain from living an inspired religious life, or at least limit their spiritual pursuits, because they fail to recognize their own greatness.  A life of passionate commitment to Torah and mitzvos is sometimes seen as something for the elite, or  “not for me.”  But we must always remember that we are great, and that Torah - with all of its depth - was given for “people like us.”       

The verse says regarding the commandment of tzitzit, “In order to remember and do the commandments (למען תזכרו ועשיתם אותם)”.  Seemingly this verse advises us to look at the tzitzis and remember the mitzvos so we will perform them.  However, if this was the case the verse should have read “and remember them (תזכרו אותם).”  The Sefas Emes therefore suggests that the verse is not instructing us to remember the mitzvos, but rather to remember ourselves.  Be aware of how truly great you are, and then you will be in a position to fulfill the second half of the verse and live a life of passionate commitment to Torah and mitzvos.    

Parsha: Aharon Listened to God - A Chiddush???

Rav Yehuda Turetsky

The Torah (Bamidbar 8:3) finds it necessary to state that Aharon obeyed God’s command to light the Menorah. As Aharon had already distinguished himself as an extremely committed and dedicated Jew, one recognized by Hashem for his religious accomplishments, one can surely wonder why the Torah felt the need to explicitly inform us of Aharon’s performance of the Mitzvah of Menorah.  Is it not obvious that Aharon would listen to God?

Why does the Torah find it necessary to explicitly record that Aharon obeyed God’s directive?

Ramban (ad loc) writes that Aharon lit the Menorah each day despite there being no obligation to do so. His children were also permitted to light, yet he made sure that he would be the one lighting each day. Some explain that what motivated Aharon was not c”v selfishness, but rather an awareness that he was in a unique position to best fulfill this Mitzvah.[1]

For Ramban, Aharon’s actions are recorded because they went above and beyond his core responsibilities and obligations. His desire to do Mitzvot was so great that he lit the Menorah each day despite not being required to do so. 

Rashi (ad loc) explains that the Torah is praising Aharon for not changing at all from what Hashem commanded. Rashi may be highlighting an important yet underappreciated element of Avodat Hashem. It is easy to overlook the challenge in strict observance of Mitzvot. Many desire and actively perform Mitzvot, but very few are able to consistently follow each and every part of the Divine command.

Ramban reminds us that ambition in Avodat Hashem often demands doing not only that which we are commanded. We are to try and fulfill all Mitzvot, even those we are not required to perform. Rashi highlights an alternate pathway towards religious excellence. For him, greatness is found not only in the ambitious desire to do that which is not required. Meeting one’s obligations in an exacting and precise way is also a form of greatness.

[1] This general approach relates to a question regarding who is permitted to light the Menorah in the Mikdash. See Talmud Yoma 24b with Ritva and Meiri (ad loc), Rambam and Ra’avad Biat HaMikdash 9:7, Devar Avraham 3:1:14, and Chidushei HaGrach (ad loc).

Parsha: The Key To Handling Rebuke - The Obscure Halachot of Erchin?!?!

Rav Turetsky

The Tochacha (rebuke) found in Parshat Bechukotai is incredibly harsh and contains a variety of terrible calamities that could befall the Jewish people. No doubt those who hear the Tochacha would be moved to improve their actions and respond by bettering themselves. What’s most interesting is that the Torah immediately follows the Tochacha with the Halachot of Erchin, a fairly complex set of laws in which one commits to donate to the Mikdash the “value” of an individual.

Why juxtapose the Tochacha  with the laws of Erchin? What is the connection between the laws of Erchin and the rebuke?[1]

1. Kli Yakar (Vayikrah 27:2) suggests that Erchin is a natural response to hearing Tochacha. The curses described to the Jewish people convey a sense of urgency and a need to mend one’s ways. Typically, one of the ways in which Jews respond in a time of crisis is to make Nedarim (vows), additional commitments to improve our Avodat Hashem. Erchin is one such type of vow[2].

2. Rav Morchei Yosef Leiner, known as the Ishbitzer Rebbe, offers an additional suggestion (Mai HaShiloach Parshat Bechukotai). Hearing the Tochacha could lead one to feel hopeless and abandoned. In contrast, the message of Erchin, that one could donate one’s own value to the Mikdash, shows that one can always be “redeemed”. Despite hearing the terrible curses, we are reminded that we still have a value, and that we can always redeem ourselves.[3]

Rebuke is hard to hear. Kli Yakar reminds us that it is appropriate to respond with an increased commitment to Avodat Hashem. The Ishbitzer highlights an additional and critically important point. There is always hope and we always have value. Regardless of where we are, there is always potential for improving our relationship with Hashem and others.

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[1]See Ramban (Vayikrah 27:1-2) for an additional perspective.

[2] Kli Yakar also notes Ba’al HaTurim’s explanation for the juxtaposition of the Parshiot, which he views in line with his own understanding.

Kli Yakar further notes that Yaakov also made such a Neder in a troubling time, though he was able to maintain his commitment. He notes that too often people make such commitments upon feeling a sense of urgency, but struggle maintaining them once things have calmed down. 
[3] See inside regarding the value of Erchin when one’s donating the value of someone else.